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Summary findings
Gonzalez and Maloney derive a methodology for  They model the decision to move as a stopped Markov
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when salaried workers enter the informal self-employed  sectors dictated by the forecasted stream of discounted
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A substantial  literature  exists on limited  dependent  models  in a panel context (see
or Maddala 1983  or Baltagi, 1996 for overviews)  and continuous  dependent  variables  in
an incomplete  or rotating panel context (Bjom and Jansen 1983, Nijman, Hsiao 1986,
Verbeek and van Soest 1991). This paper derives a methodology  for estimating logit
models  in a rotating  panel. It then uses the technique  to examine an unresolved  problem
in  development economics: the role of self-employed  workers unprotected by labor
legislation  in the LDC labor force. In particular,  we are interested  in the determinants  of
the decision to leave protected (formal) work to enter self-employment.  An alternative
theoretical model to the dualistic view generally  accepted is offered.  Both views are
tested using rotating  panel data set from Mexico  and the alternate  view supported.
II.  An Alternate View of Informal Self-employment
Much of the literature on the informal self-employed sector in  LDCs beginning
with  Harris and  Todaro(1970) has  seen  self-employed workers unprotected  by  labor
legislation as those rationed  out of  protected or "formal"  salaried jobs  sector jobs  by
above market clearing remuneration in the protected sector.  Transitions should be largely
unidirectional, from the informal and presumably very low capitalized micro-enterprises,
to the formal sector except in the event of downturns in which case laid off workers will
be thrown back on the informal safety net.
However,  there is little reason to suppose that the expanding literature on self-
employment in the industrialized world that views self-employment  as a desirable and
Imore flexible alternative to wage work may not also be relevant in LDCs.  In particular,
the  debate  over  the  dynamics  underlying  patterns  of  worker  transitions  into  self-
employment is likely to be relevant.  Johnson (1978), Jovanovic (1979) and Miller(1984)
argue that younger individuals are better able to bear the risk involved and hence should
be heavily  represented among entrants  into self-employment. However,  as Evans and
Jovanovic note, this  is inconsistent  with  Evans  and Leighton's  (1989)  finding of the
hazard  into  self-employment  being  constant  in  age which  they  attribute  to  liquidity
constraints that dictate that workers require time to build up the capital needed to start a
business.
We  argue that  this  phenomenon  may be  exacerbated  in the  developing  world
where  credit  markets  are poorly  developed.  The problem  can  be  seen  as  a  Stopped
Markovian  Decision  Process  (SMDP) 1 where  workers,  faced  with  uncertainty  about
future streams of income as salaried and self-employed workers must decide the optimal
savings and switching strategies.  Their behavior can be seen as similar to that of workers
who, perhaps with the idea of opening a business upon their return, migrate to a country
that offers the possibility  of accumulating wealth more quickly, and return home only
when they reach their target level of savings (See Piore 1979).  This problem has been
analyzed in detail by Berninghaus and Seifert-Vogt (1993) and we adapt their work to our
problem as a way of generating predictions to be tested in the empirical work.
We assume the worker will open his own business at time X and plans on operate
it  for  T-r  years  where  T  is  the  end  of  his  planning  horizon.  He  has  subjective
' See Eckstein and Wolpin(1989) for a review of the specification and estimation of dynamic stochastic
discrete choice models.
2expectations  7t on the return to his invested accumulated real wealth x, in the business.
Upon starting his business, the worker will choose a sequence of consumption bundles, c,
such as to maximize
T
E  U(C  r)
s.t.  O<ct<xt  xt+ 1= 7(xt-  ct )  t  =  ,...,T,  where u(.) represent the continuous per period
utility function. We abstract from the discount factor since it will be the same in both
sectors and we assume it unchanged. This reduces to  a standard dynamic programming
problem where V. (x) is the value function at switch time  r, the maximal value of the sum
of per period utility from being an entrepreneur from , to T.
While in the salaried sector from t = 1, ..., (X-1)  the worker earns yt where {YtJ,
is a stochastic process whose probability law is known to the worker.  In each period, the
worker chooses a consumption bundle c, subject to the condition c 1 <  (x, + y).  Any
surplus can be saved at a real interest rate, it+,  which is the realized value of a stochastic
process {IJ, of real interest rates.  In each period, the worker must decide whether to work
in the salaried sector for another period, or start his business and receive V,(x~.
The optimal policy for this problem is a sequence of consumption strategies (c(.)
and the stopping (switching) time T such that the total expected reward E
E(xo  io,yo)(  U(C/(.))  +  Vr(xr)1
t=O
is maximized  given the initial state(xo, io,yo). The optimal stopping time is associated
3with  each  "state  history"  (xp it,y)  and  because these  are realizations  of a  stochastic
process, T too,  is a random variable.
From the framework, several predictions emerge. First, there exists a critical level
of target savings below which the worker will prefer to continue to stay salaried.  For the
case of a two period model with logarithmic utility, Berninghaus and Seifert-Vogt show
that  the  target  level  of  savings  falls  with  a  rise  in  the  subjective  return  to  self-
employment, x, rises with an increase in the opportunity cost of savings, i, and rises if a
higher wage  in  the  salaried  sector raises  the required  comparable  stream of  income
resulting from self-employment, and hence the start up capital required.  The first two
also have a predictable effect on the switch time, Tr.  In the last case, however, the overall
impact of current income on T is ambiguous since higher incomes both increase the level
of target savings as well as increase the possible rate of savings accumulation.  Given two
workers with identical savings, the one with higher income may find himself below the
target rate of income and stay one more period to earn another period wage. 2
In sum, the probability of a move into self-employment at a particular moment:
Pr(move) = P( 7c,i,y)
ai'  al  aP ->0,  -<O,  -=?
as  ai  ay
It is worth comparing these predictions to those from the standard dualistic view
where an above market clearing formal sector remuneration, y, rations workers into the
informal sector where the returns fall to  absorb those  in the queue.  A fall in relative
2By  the  same  token,  a worker  who  suddenly  loses  his  job, y goes  to 0, will  suddenly  see  the  target  lev,el  of
saving  decline  and  is more  likely  to move. In  this  way,  the common  vision  of the  informal  sector  as  the
reserve  army  of the  unemployed  can  be seen  in somewhat  different  light.
4returns of  self-employment for  salaried work poccurs  in  the  contp,xti  of  economic
downturns  where the informal  return must fall to absorb  displaced  workers. Similarly,  to
the degree that increased interest rates are associated with recession and the loss of
salaried  jobs, again, we may expect more movement  of the displaced into the informal
sector: movement into self-employment  would be counter-cyclical. In both cases, the
predicted  signs  would  be the opposite  of those  postulated  by the model  above. 3
The next section offers a method for using logit methods in a rotating panel
context to estimate the determinants  of the worker's decision  to move, and hence to test
between  these two  views.
HII.  Logit Analysis in a Rotating Panel Context
Selection of  Individuals
In the relatively common case that we address, individuals are selected according
to a "rotating" scheme in the following manner.  In period 1 of a total of T periods, the
first sample  is selected  of N individuals  who will remain  in the sample  for z periods: yll,
Y21  YNI. In the second period,  the first m = NIz individuals  are retired and the first
place until the Nth place are occupied by the individuals who follow individual m: Y12,  Y22
. . -,YN2.  The process  of retiring and replacing continues for each period t  with  a  new
sample:  Y,t  Y2t  ,--YNt.
The combination of data obtained by this process is called a Rotating Panel and
we
can considered  it ordered  as:
3 See  Maloney  (1997)  for a discussion  of the relative  merits  of formal vs informal  work  and the
procyclicality  of the latter  in Mexico.
5Y115Y2154tulx  Y(m+1)13  ...  ...- YNI
Y12'Y22  ... Ym2 Y(m+1)2  ...  .YN2
Y13  .. - Ym3-  ...  *.-.-YN3
In this manner, H = (T-I)m + N  individuals are partially observed across T periods.  In
our example, y represents whether the worker moves in that period (y=l) or stays in
salaried employment (y=O).
It is useful to reframe the problem as a T X H fixed panel:
Y'11  Y 21.  YHI
Y 12  Y22  . Y  2
Y  IT Y2T .......... H
where  Yjt denotes the position of individual j in time t, whether there is an entry or, not.
For example: Y  12 Y  22 ........ Y m2 are positions  that do not have entries.
Observation: Each position in the fixed panel corresponds to one in the rotating sample:
Y  jt= Yj  (t  l)m  t  ( I )
However, an individual is included in the rotating sample, and has an entry in the fixed
panel in time t only if:
I < j  - (t  - l)m  <  N
In the analysis, we will only be concerned with individuals in the sample for a full
z periods which can be shown to be the case for individuals entering the panel in  t
E {1,2,...,T-z+l  }.  Several results pertaining to this group are described in appendix I.
6Definition:  For  t e  {  1,2,...,T-z+1  }, if  individual j enters the sample of size N in period
t, we define  as a vector representing the sequence of the z consecutive entries.
= (Yit, Yi(t+,. Yj(ezl  ))
In the present application, this is the sequence of moves that individual j  is observed to
make across the z periods  in the sample. In theory, there  could be multiple moves  or
none.
Probability Function
We are interested in understanding what determines the timing of the individual's
decision  to  change  state.  To  be  consistent  with  the  theory  above,  we  assume  the
individual moves only once into self-employment, and that the decision to move in each
period is independent of the previous decisions.  The vector
e'k  (0,  1,0  O.0)  E RZ
t  position k
permits us to identify the period in which the individual changes state.
We define the  probability that  an  individual j  that  has  been k  periods  in  the
sample,  changes its state in period t, and that it changes only once as:
pj,(k)  =  p  rvt  = ek  ijj(tk-1)  k=1,2,3,...,z
To calculate pjt(k), we first find an expression for:
7p (YJ7 =  e,k  )  k = 1,2,...z
For example:
p(Yj,  = el) = p(yjt  = 1)p(yj,,,  = 0)  ...p(yj+-l  = 0)
We  assume  that  the  probability  that  an  individual  changes  state  follows  a  logit
distribution, and this probability is a function of a set of the environment and individual's
characteristics (X). This can be shown equal to:
exp[8Xj-(,-l)mt] 
(I + exp[Ej  fX)j  t ]) (1  + exp[Yj  ,,m,t+l]) (1 + eXP[Xj-(+z-2)m,t+z-1])
exp  [,iX j-(t-l)m,t ]
M  j  (6 )
where Mjt(  6)  is the product of the denominators above.  Generalizing, we obtain that the
probability of changing states exactly once in the kth period of observation is:
p (Yj,  = ek  exp  [8Xj-(+k- 2 )m,t+k-]
The probability of moving in the kth period of observation, given that the individual will
move exactly once in one of the k periods is:
Pj,jt  =ke))+  p(Yj,  = e2 k+.+p(Yit  =  e:)
exp[fXiXt+k-2)m,t+k-l I
exp[iXj3t_)m,t  I + eXp[L8jtmt+l ].  .*  + eXP[jXt+z- 2)m,t+z- 1]
And finally, the conditional probability that individual j who enters in the sample of size
N in period t and remains z periods counting from t and who changes state in exactly one
of the z periods is:
8pj  Pj  ,(l)  j Pj (2)Yit+...  Pj (z),"+'
As Yij  takes a value of 0 or 1, and in our example there is uniquely one non-zero entry,
this expression effectively selects which Pjt determines Pjt.
Likelihood Function
Before writing the likelihood function we establish some definitions to simplify
the presentation.
Definition:  Let M(K*J) be the set of the matrix of rank  (K*J).  If  1 < u < K,  we can
define:
ir.: M(K*  J)  -RJ
)r.(A)  = g.u(akj)1,5kK = (aulu2)-...aKJ)
which states that  ir  projects the row u of the matrix A.  This ensures the condition that
each individual moves only once or:
,Yj,  +zr2Yj,+  .+C,'Yj, = 1
Definition:  Let Bt  = {j such that  'lyK t + 'T 2 §,i  +...+;r:Yj,  = 1  }, that is the set of j where
the individual moves only once.
Definition: Let B  =  {Bt such that  1 < t < T - z + 1}, that is, the set of Bt such that the
individual is in the sample for exactly five periods.
Definition:  Let  Xj,  be  the  z*p matrix  of  independent explanatory variables  for each
individual (See appendix for more detail).
With these definitions, we can rewrite  Pj,  (k) as:
9Pj,  (k) =  z  1  V  1<k<z
E  exp[Q(, - TOk)XiJt]
and finally:
Pi,t =j  7Pj(k)  kyl
k=1
Therefore the log of the likelihood function for all individuals  in the panel through all
periods will be:
2=  EX  lnpj,  = -Z  zrkYj,  lnzexp(f7T,  - k]xIfi))
teB  jeB,  teB  jeB,  k=1  /=1
Employing the  Newton-Raphson algorithm, the  first  and  second derivative of  the
likelihood  function  with respect  to the parameters  are calculated  as:
Vi(/)  (O  E  {eXpV1  - 'k  W]t /6)}T[  - ;k  W}jl >i
tEB  jeB,  k=1  1=1
V 22  ,(/J)  = -_  EEEEZ  gkyJt  Pl  exp([r,  +,T, - 2,, ]jxj 1f) *[V 1 -r];XjJ If  [1-)r  Jjty]
leB jEB,  k=1 1=1 r>l
which permits us to estimate /3, and V(,B).
IV. Data:
The National  Urban Employment  Survey (NUES)  conducts extensive  quarterly
household interviews in the major metropolitan areas and is available from 1987 to 1993.
It is structured as a rotating panel where in each quarter, a fifth of the sample is dropped
and replaced by individuals who will be interviewed for each of the next five quarters. In
24 overlapping panels spanning  1987-1993, individual workers can be followed as the
10move  among sectors  of  work.  Individuals  are matched by  position  in  an  identified
household,  sex,  level  of  education,  and  age  to  ensure  against  generating  spurious
transitions. The analysis restricts itself to men aged 16-65 with a high school education or
less.  It  also  focuses  on  formal  salaried  workers  and  the  "informal"  self-employed,
including  owners  of firms  under  16 employees  who do  not  have  social security  or
medical benefits and are therefore not protected. 4 Only those who begin in formal salaried
employment and move only once over five quarters into self-employment are retained,
yielding a sample of 1087 workers.  In the estimations, we employ predicted earnings in
each sector as a measure of the "own" and "alternate" earnings, given the standard human
capital variables,  experience,  experience squared,  education, education  squared.  The
return to accumulated capital  (the opportunity cost of using savings to open a business) is
the real 30-60 day deposit rate as calculated from the International Financial Statistics of
the IMF deflated by growth of the consumer price index. We also test state dependence
through introducing the lag of the independent variables in the regressions.
V. Results:
Table 1 presents the results of the estimation of the model set out in section II.
Table 1:  Results from Rotating Panel  Logit Regression
COEF.  S.E  COEF  S.E.
Wage (Salaried)  -.347  1.34  -.357  1.28
Wage (-1)  .132  1.41  X  l
Earnings (Self)  4.02  .249  4.03  .235
Earnings (-1)  -.115  .354  l
Interest Rate  -3.39 e-3  2.45 e-5  -2.71 e-3  1.92 e-5
Interest Rate(-1)  -2.68 e-3  1.93 e-5  -3.83 e-3  1.65 e-5
Nobs=1078,  Sample  includes  24 complete  panels  of 5 quarters  each spanning  1987-1993
4 It is often  the case  that the informal  sector is defined  as firms with  five or less workers. As we are
ocusing  on informality  defined  as being unprotected  by social  security  or other  legislation,  we loosen  the
size limit  to the next category  tabulated. In practice,  the vast majority  of fimns  are under  3 workers.
11The results are supportive  of the model.  The first and second columns  present  the
complete specification and  show that for only the  interest rate are  lagged values
significant. This suggests the absence of state dependence. The second specification
presents only the significant coefficients.  Here, self-employed  earnings appear very
strongly and of the correct sign reflecting  that as opportunities  improve in the informal
sector, workers are more likely to open their own businesses. The current wage in.  the
formal sector still enters ambiguously,  again, as predicted,  and is not significant. This is
to  be  expected given that a rise both increases the  attractiveness of formal sector
employment,  and raises the savings  rate making a move into self-employment  possible.
Finally,  the interest rate is strongly  significant  and of the predicted  sign suggesting  that a
rise in the opportunity  cost of the capital used for start up discourages  opening lup  a
business. In all cases, the sign is the opposite  of that predicted  by conventional  dualistic
views of informal  self-employment.
Appendix  II derives  the cross section  marginal  effects  and Table 2 calculates  them
for the regression  above.  In each  panel of the table, k represents  the period in which  the
individual  moved  and h the period corresponding  to the variables  observed. Of greatest
importance,  the diagonals  of the tables are both relatively  stable  and of the sign  foundL  in
table 1. Calculating  the marginal  effects  has not reversed  the effect as is sometimes
found and the theoretical  framework  remains supported.  The off-diagonal  elements
(symmetric)  are less intuitive. In every case  the impact  of the variable  one period
forward  or backward  has the reverse  impact  of the contemporaneous  effect.
12Table 2: Cross  Section  Marginal  Effects
Self-Employed  Earnings
dPjt(k)/dX 1 h
k\  h  1  2  3  4
1  0.6978200  -0.1989130  -0.2283948  -0.2705122
2  0.6957832  -0.2274624  -0.2694078
3  0.7651952  -0.3093380
4  0.8492580
Formal  Sector  Wage
dPjt(k)/dXVh
k\  h  1  2  3  4
1  -0.0617104  0.0175905  0.0201977  0.0239222
2  -0.0615302  0.0201152  0.0238246




k\  h  1  2  3  4
1  -0.0004693  0.0001338  0.0001536  0.0001819
2  -0.0004680  0.0001530  0.0001812
3  -0.0005147  0.0002081
4  -0.0005712
Interest  Rate Lagged
dPjt(k)/dX"h
k\  h  1  2  3  4
1  -0.0006628  0.0001889  0.0002169  0.0002569
2  -0.0006609  0.0002160  0.0002559
3  -0.0007268  0.0002938
4  -0.0008066
13Table 3 derives  the marginal  effects  over time,  which are calculated  by taking  the
difference  between  the maximum  and the minimum  value of each variable.  As with the
cross sectional  marginal effects,  the signs  are those  predicted  and expected  self-employed
earnings  is the most important  variable  to explaining  the transitions change from formal
to informal  sector.
Table  3: Marginal  Effects  Over Time
Variable  Variation  Probability  Variation
Formal  Sector Wage  0,3654  -0,0315
Self-Employed  Earnings  0,2411  0,29  13
Interest  Rate  57,83  -0,0377
Interest  Rate  Lagged  64,03  -0,0429
VI. Conclusion
The paper has derived a methodology  for analyzing logit models in a rotating
panel context.  Using data from Mexico,  it then applied the technique  to test between  two
theories of why salaried workers  enter the informal self-employed  sector. The evidence
supports a view that self-employment is a desirable destination, but one that in the
presence  of credit constraints  requires  accumulated  capital before the business is opened,
over the more traditional view of self-employment  as  a safety net for those losing
preferred  formal sector  jobs.
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16Appendix  I
Theorem:  Individual  j enters  the rotating  sample  of size N in period t only if:
(z - l)m  + I < j  - (t  -l)m  < N  (2)
Demonstration:  The last m entries  of the sample  of size  N=zm can be written  as
{  Y(z-I)m+i,t,  Y(z-l)m+2,  t.  YN,  t}
For individual  j to be one of these entries,  condition  (1) implies  condition  (2). If (2) holds
we can also show  that jyj, has an entry and that at time t, the individual  has just entered
the sample  of size N.
Observation:  Only for t e {  1,2,.  ..,T-z+1 } are the last m individuals  entering  the sample
of size N observed  for all z periods.  There are
(T  - z  +  1)(N  - (z  - I)m)  = (T  - z + I)N
z
such individuals  of the H total.
Corollary: For  t  E  {1,2,...,T-z+l  } condition (2) is  necessary and sufficient for
individual  j to be observed  for z periods.
Appendix  II
The sequence  of decisions  to stay or move for each individual  is the vector
it=  [Yj-(t-1)mJ '  Yj-tm,t+  I ..  9  *Yj-(t+z-2)m,t+z-1]
and the set of variables  that determine  that choice:
Xj -Q-1)m,f  j-(I-l)m,t  XJ (t-l)m  t
Xlj-tm,t+l
XI  ...  ... 
j-(t+z-2)m,t+z-1  Xj  (-+z-2)m,r+z-l
17We distinguish  two types of marginal  effect,  across  the individuals  and across  time.
Cross Section  Marginal  Effect
The cross section  marginal  effect  measures  the change  in the probability  of a move due to
individual  differences  in the independent  variables. For each individual  we can write:
-pj  (%,pj,(k)  apj,(k)  apj,(k) 
ax'  ix'i'ax
Ia  Xj  -(I  1)MI  t  xj-Im,1+l  axj  (t+z-2)m,i+z-1
orh=  1,2,..  . ,z
apj,  (k)  sj, (k)  1  sjt  (k)
aXj  (I+h-2)m,+h-l aXj  (t+h  2)m,t+h-I  s, (k) aXj-(t+h-2)m,t+h-I
1  [e  p[x  X /'  ferxu']]
sj, (k) 
8 XjQ(,+h 2)mt+h1-
I  ______  [,j]'*  6ie-4[kX  +  - l*  8e 4 fXjf]  1
S,(k)l  r=1  aXj-(Q+h-2)m,t+h-I  J
__  [  [  r  ]*  -AIkxJI,] *  [-fikXJ~]'  +]  *e2tX-Jk]'  8[f  ifkXJ-x 1 S  i.  r=1  ]  *  j-Qt+h-2)m,I+h-1  r=1ax
sj, (k)  x  r=j-(t+h-2)m,i+h-I
we know  that:
4/J7TrXJtl  8f4i6Xj-(t+r- 2)m,t+r-l + fl2Xj-(t+r-2)m,t+r-I  +  +iPXT(t+r 2)mt+r1]
aXJ  --(t+h-2)m,t+h-I  IDxji  1(t+h-2)m,t+h-I
1881  Vr = h  Pi  {0  Vr# 
ii  Vrh
where:  Srh=o  Vr￿h
therefore
ap 1 , (k)  1  [  *  ]  [  e]
j-(t+h-2)m,t+h-1  L  ]  +  *  r=[
~Pf  (k)Z3,Bj(Sh  -)  s,  k)X  )x,,r]
r=l
Marginal Effect Over Time (MEOT)
The marginal effect over time measures the change in the probability of a move with
diffferent levels in an independent variable. Given that we work in discrete time, for each
individual we can write:
Marginal Effect Over Time  = (pjt (k +  1) - pjt (k)|Xi(k+)  ￿  xk),  Vk=1,2, **,z-1
We have that:
eflkk+IXPe]  fl[kXjt]
Pj, (k + 1) =  z  ,  and  Pjt  (k) = -
z  z :~~~~~~  Lefll"  Eepl*j]
h=1  h=l
Therefore:
i  I  wB~~~~~~~~,6Xrx-(t+k-2)mit+k- [  eA'  X-(I+k- 1 )mJ+k  - efliXj-(+k-2)m,t+k-1  ]er  r=l
MEOT  =  |
h=1
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